A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process as a Trigger for a Right of Access to State-held DNA Evidence by Dietrich, Ryan
Maryland Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 4 Article 6
A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency
Process as a Trigger for a Right of Access to State-
held DNA Evidence
Ryan Dietrich
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryan Dietrich, A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process as a Trigger for a Right of Access to State-held DNA Evidence, 62 Md.
L. Rev. 1028 (2003)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/6
A UNILATERAL HOPE: RELIANCE ON THE CLEMENCY
PROCESS AS A TRIGGER FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO STATE-HELD DNA EVIDENCE
Public confidence in the criminal justice system is consistently
haunted by the possibility that constitutionally mandated procedures
are insufficient to prevent conviction of the innocent.1 Although re-
cent advances in DNA technology have demonstrated this possibility
to be a reality,2 the Supreme Court has stood by its determination that
a post-conviction finding of actual innocence does not afford an oth-
erwise constitutionally convicted individual the right to be released.3
Instead, the Supreme Court and lower courts have concluded that the
proper channel for the wrongfully, yet constitutionally convicted pris-
oner to pursue a claim of innocence is through the clemency pro-
cess.4 This strict reliance on clemency as a "fail safe" mechanism is at
odds with the Supreme Court's view that the decision to grant clem-
ency is completely protected from the due process restraints of judi-
cial review.5 Therefore, to ensure the integrity of clemency as the sole
remedy for the wrongfully convicted, "principles of justice"6 mandate
1. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (stating that "due process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the
possibility of convicting an innocent person"); U.S. v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) (noting that "[o]ur procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent
man convicted. It is an unreal dream").
2. See The Innocence Project: Home (July 16, 2003) (describing the organization's
successful efforts in exonerating over 131 prisoners using DNA technology) at http://
www.innocenceproject.org.
3. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (finding that "a claim of 'actual
innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim").
4. See id. at 411-12 (stating that "it is clear that clemency has provided the historic
mechanism for obtaining relief" in actual innocence cases); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d
1069, 1074 (5th. Cir. 1998) (finding that without the existence of the clemency process, a
claim of actual innocence may be constitutionally warranted); Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d
239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (justifying the failure to recognize the existence of an actual inno-
cence claim on the availability of the Virginia clemency process).
5. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1998) (finding that
the clemency decision is not constrained by due process and is only a "matter of grace");
Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1981) (removing the clemency
decision from due process review and describing the process as a "unilateral hope").
6. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 523 (1992) (holding that in issues of criminal procedure, in order to prevent
intrusion "[u]pon the administration of justice by the individual States," a decision is "not
subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental' ").
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that prisoners be given a meaningful opportunity to present evidence
of actual innocence to the clemency authority.
This Comment discusses the constitutional consequences of plac-
ing this "fail safe" duty in the clemency authority. While the Supreme
Court has charged the clemency process with this critical function, it
has nevertheless insulated the clemency decision from constitutional
due process. Accordingly, this Comment advocates for a due process
right to meaningful access to evidence and an opportunity to present
that evidence to the clemency authority. Specifically, this Comment
advocates the right to access state-held evidence for the purposes of
modern DNA testing.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the necessity of a constitutional right of
post-conviction access to state-held DNA evidence, it is important to
first be familiar with the evolution of four developments of our crimi-
nal justice system. To that end, this Part discusses, first, the conse-
quences of the Supreme Court's failure to recognize the role of courts
in adjudicating claims of "actual innocence."7 Second, this Part exam-
ines the Supreme Court's historical dependency on, and designation
of, the clemency process as a fail safe for constitutionally convicted yet
innocent prisoners.' Third, this Part discusses the constitutional limi-
tations that the Supreme Court has placed on the clemency process. 9
Finally, this Part discusses the courts' treatment of an individual's con-
stitutional right of access to state-held evidence for the purpose of sub-
jecting it to newly developed DNA testing technology.1 0
A. The Supreme Court's Refusal to Recognize a Claim of Actual Innocence
The United States Constitution does not guarantee that only the
guilty will be convicted, but instead ensures that the proper proce-
7. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (finding that "a claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a
constitutional claim").
8. See id. at 412 (stating that "clemency has provided the historic mechanism for ob-
taining relief" when a convicted prisoner can demonstrate factual innocence).
9. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 280-81 (finding that the clemency decision is not con-
strained by due process and is only a "matter of grace"); Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464-65
(removing the clemency decision from due process review and describing the process as a
"unilateral hope").
10. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002), reh' denied en banc, 285 F.3d 298
(4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to find a constitutional due process right to access evidence for
purposes of DNA testing).
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dures are followed en route to those convictions." Among these con-
stitutionally mandated procedures are protections against self-
incrimination, an impartial jury, the ability to confront adverse wit-
nesses, and the right to ajury trial. 12 These constitutional safeguards
recognize the trial as the ultimate forum for the determination of an
accused's guilt or innocence."
In addition to these procedural rights, our state and federal crim-
inal justice systems guarantee an accused a presumption of innocence
before the factfinder. 14 However, after a person is determined to be
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this presumption of innocence "dis-
appears" and the convicted person becomes "legally guilty."15 Al-
though the role of our criminal justice system is to convict only those
who are actually guilty,' 6 the Supreme Court has stopped short of stat-
ing that the avoidance of an erroneous conviction should be the ulti-
mate objective.17 Instead, the Court has held that the proper
conviction of a person found "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" is
the paramount event under the Constitution allowing states to deprive
convicted individuals of certain rights.' 8
A convicted person, however, retains certain rights, including
those granted by the state that convicted him."9 Although not consti-
tutionally mandated, all states allow a prisoner to request a new trial
11. See Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (stating that "due process does
not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibil-
ity of convicting an innocent person").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed...; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (finding a
right to trial by jury in criminal adjudications).
13. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398.
14. In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (describing the presumption of innocence
as a "bedrock . .. principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administra-
tion of our criminal law'" (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))).
15. Id. at 399-400 (stating that after his conviction, the petitioner "[did] not come
before the Court as one who is innocent, but, on the contrary, as one who has been con-
victed by due process of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 419 (O'Connor,J.,
concurring).
16. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (noting the "elemental appeal" of the proposition that the
Constitution prohibits the imprisonment of innocent persons).
17. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (stating that "[p]unishment of
those found guilty by ajury, for example, is not forbidden merely because there is a remote
possibility in some instances that an innocent person might go to jail").
18. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416.
19. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (reaffirming the prisoner's right of
access to the courts).
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based on new evidence not available at the first trial. ° While some
states have no time limit for such requests,2 ' Maryland has a time limit
of one year 22 and Virginia has a much shorter time limit of twenty-one
days. 23 Once this period expires, the prisoner may not request a new
trial based solely on the claim that new evidence demonstrates com-
plete innocence.2 4
In 1993, the Supreme Court examined whether these statutory
limitations on the ability to request a new trial could withstand consti-
tutional muster if a prisoner requesting a new trial after a statutory
deadline can prove actual innocence using newly discovered evi-
dence.25 In Herrera v. Collins,26 the Supreme Court determined that a
constitutionally convicted prisoner could not present a claim of inno-
cence even if he could prove that he was factually innocent using
newly discovered evidence. 27 The Court held that a showing of "ac-
tual innocence" was of little importance without the presence of an
independent constitutional violation. 28 Although the Court noted
that states were free to create judicial mechanisms for prisoners to
request new trials after valid convictions, the failure to do so did not
amount to a constitutional violation.29
In Herrera, the Court also rejected the petitioner's contention
that the incarceration of an innocent prisoner violated the due pro-
cess clause of the United States Constitution.3 ° By classifying the pris-
oner's claim as one of procedural rather than substantive due
process,3 ' the Court relied on the historical common-law ability to re-
quest a new trial to determine whether the failure to provide ajudicial
20. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-411 (recognizing the right of the states to provide a
method, or in fact no method at all, for bringing a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence).
21. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1181 (West 1985).
22. MD. R. 4-331(c).
23. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15(b) (1992). While Virginia's statute certainly provides less
time than the average state, it is by no means the stingiest. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. PROC.
§ 3.590 (1992) (providing Florida's time limit of ten days).
24. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411.
25. Id. at 407.
26. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
27. Id. at 411.
28. Id. at 404.
29. Id. at 411 (stating that "[i]n light of the historical availability of new trials ... and
the contemporary practice in the States, we cannot say that Texas' refusal to entertain
petitioner's newly discovered evidence eight years after his conviction [is
unconstitutional]").
30. Id. at 407.
31. See id. (stating that "[tihis issue is properly analyzed only in terms of procedural
due process").
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remedy was unconstitutional.3 2 Indeed, the Court held that criminal
process was "lacking only where it 'offends some principle ofjustice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."' 33 Because state legislatures and the federal govern-
ment have traditionally limited a prisoner's ability to request a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, the Court held that the fail-
ure to allow for a post-conviction request for a new trial did not
amount to a constitutional violation. 34
Although the Court stated that the Herrera decision was based on
procedural due process, it briefly addressed the petitioner's substan-
tive due process claim. 35 In an oft quoted paragraph, the Court ad-
dressed whether a capital prisoner who could produce a "truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence"' would be entitled to
present such a claim.3 6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, stated that such a showing would "render the execution of a defen-
dant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were
no state avenue open to process such a claim."37 However, the Chief
Justice ultimately stated that any prisoner attempting to demonstrate
"actual innocence" would need to meet an "extraordinarily high"
threshold.3' The Court then stated that, given this extraordinarily
high threshold, the prisoner failed to present a claim of actual inno-
cence solely on the basis of newly discovered evidence.3 9
Using this language from the Herrera opinion as a guide, several
lower courts have suggested that a claim of actual innocence may in-
deed be a valid claim.4" While many courts have addressed whether
32. See id. at 408 (stating that "[h]istorical practice is probative of whether a procedural
rule can be characterized as fundamental" (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
446 (1992))).
33. Id. at 407-08 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46).
34. Id. at 411.
35. Id. at 417.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 404 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[c]laims of
actual innocence, whether presented as freestanding ones . . . or merely as gateways to
excuse a procedural default ... should not be granted causally"); Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d
758, 766 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Herrera left open a free-standing claim of actual
innocence, but concluding that the prisoner did not meet the "'extraordinarily high bur-
den' a defendant claiming factual innocence would have to show"); United States v. Qui-
nones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing the existence of an "actual
innocence" claim); Harvey v. Horan, 2001 WL 419142, *6 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding that
there is a constitutional right of access to DNA evidence for the purpose of bringing an
actual innocence claim); Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 766 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(stating that the "Herrera court left open the question of whether a truly persuasive showing
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Herrera expressly creates a free-standing claim of actual innocence,
they have yet to adequately define the standard that should be ap-
plied. For example, in Wilson v. Greene,4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a prisoner's dem-
onstration of actual innocence was a viable claim.42 The court, citing
to the Herrera opinion, stated that a free-standing claim of actual inno-
cence "should not be granted casually. '4 3 The Wilson court then eval-
uated whether the prisoner could demonstrate, in light of the new
evidence, that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted [the prisoner] ." In applying this standard, the
court ultimately determined that the prisoner did not present a valid
claim.4
5
In Cherrix v. Braxton,46 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia considered a prisoner's attempts to obtain
funding for re-testing evidence using DNA testing procedures not
available at trial.4 7 The court concluded that Herrera had left open the
question of whether a free-standing claim of actual innocence could
be sustained.48 The court noted Herrera's indication that a prisoner
would have to make a "truly persuasive showing of actual innocence,"
but nevertheless stated that if the prisoner acquired exculpatory re-
sults using DNA evidence, the court "would not be required to ignore
such persuasive evidence of actual innocence."49 However, the court
stressed that any new evidence would have to "unquestionably estab-
lish the person's innocence. 5 °
Given this "extraordinarily high" standard, it has proved difficult
for convicted persons to demonstrate actual innocence.5' Although
many courts have examined the existence of a claim of actual inno-
of actual innocence could be an independent constitutional basis for federal habeas re-
lief'); Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D. 1999) (stating that "courts should sol-
emnly consider reopening a case if a 'truly persuasive' showing of actual innocence lies
close at hand").
41. 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 404.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 405.
45. Id.
46. 131 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Va. 2001).
47. Id. at 761.
48. Id. at 766.
49. Id. at 767.
50. Id. at 766 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995)).
51. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); see also Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 766,
768 (4th Cir. 1993) (failing to articulate a standard for "actual innocence," but holding
that the prisoner did not meet that standard).
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cence, none has upheld such a claim. 2 However, a constitutionally
convicted yet innocent prisoner's ability to obtain freedom is not lim-
ited to the judicial process.
B. The Supreme Court's Reliance on Clemency as the "Fail Safe"for
Innocent Prisoners
According to the Herrera Court, just because an actually innocent
prisoner cannot use the judicial system to obtain habeas relief solely
from new evidence does not leave the individual "without a forum to
raise his actual innocence claim."53 The Court in Herrera stated that
the existence of clemency proceedings creates a "fail safe" for actually
innocent prisoners without an otherwise recognized remedy.54 In its
analysis of the traditions of the criminal justice system, the Court rec-
ognized the clemency process as the "historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted."55
Indeed, the Court found that clemency has been a part of the Ameri-
can criminal landscape since the country's founding and part of the
English criminal justice system since "time immemorial."56 The Court
thus held that the creation of a judicial remedy was not necessary for
the constitutionally convicted yet actually innocent prisoner because
clemency is the appropriate forum for adjudicating actual innocence
claims.57
In Royal v. Taylor,58 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit expressly stated that the existence of Virginia's clem-
ency process precluded the availability of a free-standing claim of ac-
tual innocence.59 The court held that when a prisoner does not allege
an underlying independent constitutional violation, "state clemency
proceedings provide the proper forum for pursuing claims of actual
innocence based on new facts."6" After noting the existence of Vir-
52. See supra note 40 (describing courts which have entertained the existence of a claim
of actual innocence).
53. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411.
54. Id. at 415.
55. Id. at 411-12 (reaffirming the proposition that if the Constitution or a statute has
not been violated, the judicial branch cannot provide a remedy).
56. Id. at 412-13 (stating that clemency has been available in America since the British
Colonies were founded, and has "been exercised from time immemorial by the executive
of that nation whose language is our language" (quoting United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833) (Marshall, J.))).
57. Id. at 412 (stating that "it is clear that clemency has provided the historic mecha-
nism for obtaining relief" for constitutionally convicted prisoners claiming to be innocent).
58. 188 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 243.
60. Id.
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ginia's clemency process, the court denied the prisoner's request for
federal habeas relief.6
In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Lucas v. Johnson6 2 pointed to the "restrictive language" of Her-
rera as justification for holding that the availability of the Texas
clemency process gives the court no option but to deny an actual in-
nocence claim." Indeed, the Lucas court interpreted the Herrera deci-
sion as automatically precluding an actual innocence claim whenever
the executive clemency process is available.64
However, this reliance on the clemency process is not universally
shared. In United States v. Quinones,6 5 Judge Rakoff of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the holding in Herrera that the clemency process is a suitable method
for gaining relief when an otherwise constitutionally convicted pris-
oner makes a convincing showing of innocence.66 Instead, Judge
Rakoff noted that several studies have shown that in recent years there
has been a steep decline in the number of clemencies granted.67
Judge Rakoff then held that the Herrera Court's refusal to recognize a
claim of actual innocence was flawed because recent advances in DNA
technology could sufficiently provide the "truly persuasive demonstra-
tion" of actual innocence that the court had suggested would trigger
such a claim.68 In fact, Judge Rakoff went as far as to declare the
federal death penalty unconstitutional because it cuts short the inno-
cent capital prisoners' potential ability to discover and demonstrate
his or her actual innocence.69
Nonetheless, most courts recognize the clemency process as the
appropriate venue for an innocent prisoner to obtain relief. 70 Al-
though the courts have traditionally relied on the clemency authority
to handle claims of "actual innocence," the courts have not mandated
61. Id.
62. 132 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1998).
63. Id. at 1075.
64. Id.
65. 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
66. Id. at 417.
67. Id. at 420; see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987) (cataloging errors in capital convictions
that have led to the execution of innocent prisoners).
68. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20.
69. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
70. See, e.g., Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that "state clemency
proceedings provide the proper forum to pursue claims of actual innocence based on new
facts").
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procedural or substantive due process protections to ensure the integ-
rity of the clemency process.
C. The Supreme Court's Failure to Place Due Process Restraints on the
Clemency Decision-Making Process
The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to place any due
process or other judicial restraints on the clemency decision. 71 In
fact, the courts have generally been unwilling to recognize any consti-
tutional right to a clemency hearing.72 In Connecticut Board of Pardons
v. Dumschat,73 the Supreme Court held that "pardon and commuta-
tion decisions have not traditionally been the business of the courts"
and therefore cannot be subject to anything but minimal judicial re-
view.74 Describing an inmate's expectation of clemency as nothing
more than "a unilateral hope," the Court in Dumschat stated that the
subjective nature of the pardoning authority to consider any and all
factors insulates the clemency process from due process
implications.75
In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,76 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a prisoner did not have a constitutional right to parole
because there is no constitutional right to be "released before the ex-
piration of a valid sentence. ' 77 The Court also held that once con-
victed, a prisoner has been effectively and constitutionally deprived of
his liberty interest.78 In addition, the Court held that absent a right
conferred by the state, a prisoner has no constitutional entitlement to
be released from a valid prison sentence.79
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,8 the Supreme Court
held that the clemency process is not an indispensable part of the
judicial process of determining the guilt or innocence of a defen-
71. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981).
72. Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing also that
"clemency does not depend upon actual innocence").
73. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
74. Id. at 464.
75. Id. at 464-65; see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280-81
(1998) (finding that the clemency process does not ensure due process procedural safe-
guards, but is a "matter of grace" which allows "the executive to consider a wide range of
factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing
determinations").
76. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
77. Id. at 7 (finding no liberty right in commutation).
78. Id.
79. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 463-64 (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7).
80. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
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dant.8" The Court confirmed the independence of the clemency pro-
cess from the judiciary,12 but rejected the assertion that it "is an
integral part of the judicial system." 3 The Court found that because
clemency proceedings are not part of the determination of guilt or
innocence at the trial, the clemency decision is insulated from review
by the judiciary.84 In addition, the Court confirmed the indepen-
dence of the clemency process by stating that clemency is most appro-
priately left to the executive branch of government and is "not
intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial process. "85
While the courts have generally recognized that clemency deci-
sions are not subject to judicial review, Justice O'Connor argued in a
concurring opinion in Woodard that the clemency process should not
exist without "some minimal procedural safeguards."86  Justice
O'Connor argued that while a clemency authority should have broad
authority to grant pardons, judicial intervention might "be warranted
in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to deter-
mine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrar-
ily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process."87 Justice
Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Woodard, further stressed that a
lack of procedural safeguards would allow for clemency procedures
"infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or the deliberate
fabrication of false evidence" to be constitutional.8 8 However, the
question of whether a truly illegal or entirely arbitrary clemency pro-
cess violates constitutional safeguards has never been decided by the
Supreme Court.
D. The Uncertainties Surrounding a Right of Post-Conviction Access to
DNA Evidence
While the Supreme Court has held that the clemency authority's
decision to grant or reject clemency is free from judicial review, 9 the
increasing use of post-conviction DNA testing has strengthened a pris-
81. Id. at 285.
82. Id. at 284 (stating that "clemency has not traditionally been the business of courts"
(quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464)).
83. Id. at 285 (stating that "clemency proceedings are not 'an integral part of the ...
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant'" (quoting Evitts v.
Lucy, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985))).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981) (holding that due
process does not require the clemency authority to provide a reason why clemency was or
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oner's ability to present a case of actual innocence to the clemency
authority."0 Advances in DNA technology have revolutionized the
American criminal justice system within the last decade.9' Whether it
is the ability to identify suspects for murders that have been unsolved
for decades or the ability to demonstrate the innocence of a prisoner
many years after his conviction, advances in DNA testing procedures
have had important post-conviction implications.92 According to the
Innocence Project, an organization comprised of law students and at-
torneys who work to exonerate prisoners using modern DNA testing,
over 131 prisoners have been found innocent as a result of favorable
DNA testing that was not available at the time of their trial.93 Al-
though access to old evidence for the purpose of modern DNA testing
is sometimes available through the prerogative of the prosecutor's of-
fice, or by statute, such access to evidence has rarely been based on
constitutional due process.94
In Cherrix v. Braxton,95 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia upheld an order granting a prisoner's re-
quest for re-testing of old evidence using advanced DNA technology
not available at his trial.96 The court held that the prisoner was enti-
tled to DNA re-testing under a federal statute97 that provides for fed-
eral funding for indigent capital defendants to pursue services that
may support a post-conviction proceeding seeking to set aside a death
sentence. 98 The court held that the re-testing was necessary so that
was not granted); Woodard, 523 U.S. at 281 (holding that a prisoner has no constitutional
right to due process in a clemency hearing).
90. See National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evi-
dence to Establish Innocence after Trial (1996) (presenting case studies of twenty-eight
instances where long-term prisoners were exonerated using DNA evidence).
91. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating
that "[w] hat DNA testing has proved, beyond cavil, is the remarkable degree of fallibility in
the basic fact-finding processes on which we rely in criminal cases").
92. Ralph Brave, DNA as Evidence: A Work in Progress, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 8, 2002, at
F1 (describing the use of DNA evidence to solve crimes that have remained unsolved for
decades).
93. The Innocence Project, supra note 2.
94. See, e.g., M. CIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-201 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1
(2001) (allowing any person convicted of a felony a conditional right to file a motion for
"new scientific investigation of human biological evidence"); but see Quinones, 205 F. Supp.
2d at 264-65 (recognizing the existence of an "actual innocence" claim); Jenner v. Dooley,
590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D. 1999) (finding a right of access to DNA evidence based on
"elementary fairness").
95. 131 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Va. 2001).
96. Id. at 770.
97. 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 8 (q) (2003).
98. Cherrix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
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the prisoner could pursue a claim of actual innocence."9 While the
court noted the holding in Herrera rejecting the existence of a claim of
actual innocence, the court stated that such exculpatory DNA evi-
dence may be enough to "meet the standard of a truly persuasive
showing of actual innocence." l00 In addition, the court held that the
prisoner was entitled to DNA re-testing so that he could present a
meaningful clemency petition.' °' On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to vacate the order authoriz-
ing the funding of DNA testing.10 2 While the Fourth Circuit upheld
the order because it determined the warden's appeal lacked jurisdic-
tion, Judge King's opinion left undisturbed the district court's reason-
ing that DNA re-testing was "necessary to support [defendant]
Cherrix's claims of actual innocence ... and innocence as a 'gateway'
to proving other constitutional claims . as well as a potential clem-
ency petition."10 3
In Quinones, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York also found that the recent advances in DNA tech-
nology since the Herrera decision invalidated the holding of Herrera
that a claim of actual innocence does not exist.14 The court stated
that modern DNA technology can "supply the kind of 'truly persuasive
demonstration' of actual innocence to which Chief Justice Rehnquist
had hypothetically alluded to [in Herrera].'' 105 The court then con-
cluded that because scientific advances such as modern DNA technol-
ogy have shown the criminal justice system to be more fallible than
previously thought, there is an intolerable possibility that capital pris-
oners may be executed before technology is developed that could
prove their innocence. 0 6 Therefore, because the implementation of
capital punishment "cut[s] off the opportunity for exoneration, de-
nies due process, and indeed, is tantamount to foreseeable, state-spon-
sored murder of innocent human beings," the court found the federal
death penalty unconstitutional.0 7
Recently, the Fourth Circuit considered whether due process
mandated that a prisoner be granted access to state-held DNA evi-
dence so that the prisoner could pursue a claim of actual inno-
99. Id. at 767.
100. Id. at 766.
101. Id. at 768-69.
102. In re Braxton, 258 F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 255 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
104. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
105. Id. at 420.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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cence. 1°8 In Harvey v. Horan, the court held that there is no
constitutional right of access to old evidence for the purpose of DNA
testing. " In an opinion denying a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge
Wilkinson reaffirmed that the prisoner's petition for access to old evi-
dence was procedurally defaulted, and held that there was no consti-
tutional right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence.110 Chief
Judge Wilkinson expressed concern over the consequences of declar-
ing such a right, including issues of federalism and the conditions
under which the right would be triggered.11 Although he recognized
that technological advances are integral to the evolution of the crimi-
nal justice system, Chief Judge Wilkinson argued that this did not
"mean that we are free to constitutionalize a right of access to the
fruits of scientific discoveries."11 2 In contrast, Chief Judge Wilkinson
stated that the proper forum for determining the existence of a right,
and the scope of such a right, was the legislature, not the courts.1tl
Judge Luttig, in an opinion respecting the denial of a rehearing,
argued that a constitutional right of access to DNA evidence existed as
a matter of fairness." 4 Rejecting the district court's reasoning for
finding a constitutional right under traditional constitutional jurispru-
dence,i1 5 Judge Luttig stated that under Mathews v. Eldridge,"'6 and
108. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002), reh'g denied en banc, 285 F.3d 298
(4th Cir. 2002).
109. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 300-04.
112. Id. at 30l.
113. Id. at 304 (stating that Judge Luttig's "approach treats both state legislatures and
state court systems as junior partners with respect to their own trials and judgments").
Prior to the final decision being issued, Harvey utilized a recently enacted Virginia statute,
VA. CooE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001), to obtain access to old evidence and subsequently was
able to perform the DNA testing that he originally had requested from the court. Brooke
A. Masters, DNA Testing Confirms Man's Guilt in Va. Rape, WASH. POST, May 16, 2002, at B1.
The test results confirmed that he was indeed involved in the 1989 rape of a Virginia wo-
man. Id.
114. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 304 (LuttigJ., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
115. Judge Luttig did not find support for a constitutional right within relevant case law.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that suppression of evidence
favorable to a defendant violates the due process clause), Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
391 (1993) (holding that there is no free-standing claim of "actual innocence," but stating
arguendo that a truly persuasive showing of freestanding actual innocence may state a
claim), or Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988) (finding that the due process
clause is violated if the prosecution fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in bad
faith). Harvey, 285 F.3d at 315 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
116. 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (creating a standard of review of constitutional viola-
tions whereby the interests of the government and the individual are balanced).
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the more stringent standard developed in Medina v. California,1 '
there is a constitutional due process right to access evidence for re-
testing when that evidence was used by the government to obtain the
defendant's conviction. '
1 8
While courts generally recognize the importance of post-convic-
tion DNA testing to the integrity of the criminal justice system, there is
no consensus as to whether the Constitution mandates that prisoners
be granted access to such evidence and testing." 9 Instead, most
courts recognize the legislative process as the proper forum for creat-
ing such a right.1 20 However, Congress and state legislatures have yet
to fully heed the call to provide prisoners with a statutory mechanism
to access evidence for DNA testing.'
21
II. ANALYSIS
This Comment advocates the recognition of a constitutional due
process right of access to state-held DNA evidence based on the recog-
nition of an implied constitutional right of meaningful access to the
clemency process. Because the Supreme Court has held that the ap-
propriate venue for a convicted yet innocent prisoner to present an
''actual innocence" claim is not in front of the courts but in front of a
clemency authority, 22 it violates due process to deny a prisoner the
meaningful ability to present evidence of innocence to the clemency
authority.
117. 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (stating that a criminal law is "not subject to proscription
under the Due Process Clause unless it 'offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"' (quoting Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (internal citations omitted)).
118. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 315 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
119. See, e.g., Harvey, 285 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in the denial of re-
hearing and rehearing en banc) (stating that although the court does not hold that there is
a constitutional right of access, prisoners should be granted access to the use of scientific
technologies through legislatively created mechanisms).
120. Id.
121. The Innocence Protection Act, which has been languishing in Congress since 2001,
would grant federal prisoners the ability to access DNA evidence for the purpose of testing
under modern DNA technology. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S.B. 486, 107th Cong.
(2001). In addition, the legislation would require "States to adopt comparable procedures
as a condition of receiving federal funds for DNA-related programs." One Page Summary
of the Leahy-Specter-Feinstein-Biden-Durbin-Edwards Substitute Amendment to S. 486,
The Innocence Protection Act (July 16, 2003), at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200207/
071102a.html. This legislation, co-sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), is likely to be
reintroduced, and is expected to pass with bipartisan support. The Innocence Project:
Legislation (July 16, 2003), at http://www.innocenceproject.org/legislation/index.php.
122. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) (stating that clemency is "the
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been
exhausted").
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This Part begins by briefly reviewing the Supreme Court decisions
that have impacted a prisoner's ability to bring an "actual innocence"
claim or a clemency petition, and the dilemma that those holdings
create. Next, this Part describes the origins and rationales for recog-
nizing both a right of meaningful access to the clemency process and
a right to access state-held DNA evidence. Third, this Part confronts
the traditional rationales for refusing to recognize such a right, and
demonstrates how framing the right within an ability to meaningfully
access the clemency process can avoid those traditional pitfalls. Fi-
nally, this Part outlines the contours of such a right, including require-
ments of materiality of the evidence and of reliability of the testing
technology.
A. The Dilemma Created by Herrera and Dumschat
To understand the necessity for a constitutional due process right
of meaningful access to the clemency process, one must understand
the dilemma created by the conflicting nature of two lines of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. In Herrera, the Supreme Court refused to recog-
nize a prisoner's ability to bring a habeas corpus claim based on his
actual innocence. 2 ' The Court held that because of the historical
unavailability of such a claim, there was no need to create a free-stand-
ing "actual innocence" claim that would disturb the finality of consti-
tutional convictions.' 24 The Court, instead, held that the proper
forum for presenting such an "actual innocence" claim was in front of
the clemency authority, not the courts.125 Describing the clemency
process as a "fail safe" for innocent prisoners, the Court relied on the
historical availability of clemency as its rationale for refusing to allow
the prisoner's habeas relief.126
In Dumschat and Woodard, the Supreme Court held that the clem-
ency decision could not be subjected to anything but minimal judicial
review.' 27 The Court held that the clemency process was completely
separate from the judicial process, and rejected the assertion that
clemency was "not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the
trial process."' 128
123. Id. at 406-07.
124. Id. at 401-02.
125. Id. at 411-12.
126. Id. at 411, 415.
127. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981); Ohio Adult Parole
Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1998).
128. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284.
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By holding that the proper forum for determining actual inno-
cence claims is the clemency process, the Court has removed an inno-
cent prisoner's last chance for freedom from the constitutionally
protected judicial process to the constitutionally void clemency pro-
cess. 129 This reflects not a disdain for the actually innocent prisoner
but a deep respect and faith in the clemency process as a "fail safe" for
ensuring that innocent prisoners are not incarcerated, or worse yet,
executed. 130 It appears hypocritical for the Supreme Court to place
great faith and respect in a process that is essentially outside the scope
of constitutional review. Nevertheless, this faith and respect are in se-
rious jeopardy if prisoners are not equipped with a right to meaning-
fully access the clemency process.
For example, in Harvey, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered a prisoner's request for access to poten-
tially exculpatory state-held DNA evidence. 13' Although the prisoner,
Harvey, proclaimed his innocence of the rape he had been convicted
of twelve years earlier, the court found that his request did not present
any constitutionally recognized claim for habeas corpus relief.'3 2
However, Harvey's actual innocence claim was to be based on the re-
sults of modern DNA testing on evidence that had been tested twelve
years ago using obsolete technology. 13 3 Nonetheless, the court denied
his request for access to this DNA evidence based on the lack of a
constitutional right of access to such evidence. 134 By failing to allow a
judicial remedy, the court left Harvey with few viable options, one be-
ing an appeal to the clemency authority."3 5 However, without excul-
patory DNA results, Harvey's appeal to the clemency authority would
be at best impotent. A failure of the clemency authority to provide
Harvey with an effective avenue of relief would, therefore, undermine
129. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (stating that the "traditional remedy for claims of inno-
cence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has
been executive clemency"); Dunnchat, 452 U.S. at 464 (stating that "pardon and commuta-
tion decisions . . . are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review").
130. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415.
131. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 372, reh'g denied en banc, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir.
2002).
132. Id. at 372, 377.
133. Id. at 375.
134. Id. at 377.
135. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (stating that the "traditional remedy for claims of inno-
cence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has
been executive clemency").
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the faith and responsibility the Herrera Court places in the clemency
process.
1 3 6
B. Supreme Court Relegation of Actual Innocence Claims to the Clemency
Process Necessitates a Due Process Right of Access to Evidence to Present a
Meaningful Claim in Front of the Clemency Authority
In Harvey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
denied Harvey's request for the DNA evidence because they saw his
request as part of an attempt to bring an actual innocence claim
before the court. 137 The court found that because the Supreme Court
had already precluded free-standing claims of actual innocence, Har-
vey's request was an impermissible method of attacking a valid convic-
tion.138 However, the court's opinion did not discuss whether access
to the evidence would have been granted had the request been based
on an ability to meaningfully present that evidence to the clemency
authority.
Because the Supreme Court has placed great weight and faith in
the clemency process as the "fail safe" for innocent prisoners, 139 the
Court should recognize a right of meaningful access to the clemency
process. Although the Court has held that the clemency decision it-
self is free from judicial review,' 4 ° the Court has consistently affirmed
the importance of the clemency process in ensuring the integrity of
the criminal justice system.1 41 Indeed, the Court in Herrera described
the deep history and entrenched role that clemency has played in
preventing the constitutionally convicted yet innocent prisoner from
languishing in prison or from being executed. 42 In addition, several
courts have relied on the holding in Herrera and based their decisions
not to grant "actual innocence" relief on the mere fact that a clem-
ency process existed in those jurisdictions.143
136. Id. at 411-12 (stating that clemency "is the historic remedy for promoting miscar-
riages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted").
137. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375 (stating that "Harvey is seeking access to DNA evidence for
one reason and one reason only-as the first step in undermining his conviction").
138. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concur-
ring in the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc).
139. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415.
140. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
141. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-17.
142. Id.
143. See Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that because Virginia
has a clemency process available to the prisoner, "we cannot grant [the prisoner] the re-
quested habeas relief based simply on his assertion of actual innocence due to newly dis-
covered evidence"); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1074-76 (5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting
the Herrera language to automatically preclude the existence of an actual innocence claim
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In relying on the clemency process to fulfill an articulated and
unique position in the criminal justice system,144 it is imperative that
the Court uphold and maintain the integrity of the process. There-
fore, the Court must ensure that prisoners have the tools necessary to
present a meaningful petition to the clemency authority. Part of this
meaningful ability to access the clemency process should be the ability
to access state-held evidence for the purposes of modern DNA testing.
Although recognizing a right of meaningful access to the clem-
ency process injects the shadow of due process over an area tradition-
ally free from judicial review,145 this proposed right would have no
bearing on the independence of the clemency authority's decision-
making process. Although Dumschat and Woodard held that the clem-
ency process and decision itself are free from judicial review,146 a con-
stitutional right to meaningfully access the clemency process does
nothing to disturb these holdings. Part of the uniqueness of the clem-
ency decision is the clemency authority's ability to use essentially any
rationale or reasoning as a basis for its clemency decision. 147 A consti-
tutional right of meaningful access would only ensure that the pris-
oner would be provided with the tools to fully craft his or her plea of
innocence. Once that plea arrives on the desk of the clemency au-
thority, that authority would remain free to reject or grant clemency
based on whatever factors that authority sees fit. 148 However, if a pris-
oner was given the ability to meaningfully present evidence to the
clemency authority, this would allow the clemency authority to more
fully fulfill its traditional "fail safe" role by making more informed,
and thereby accurate, clemency decisions. 149
Because of the long-standing history and the confidence that the
Supreme Court has placed in the clemency authority, the denial of a
prisoner's ability to meaningfully present a clemency petition violates
"a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
whenever the executive clemency process is available); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (refusing to create a free-standing claim of actual innocence based partly on
the notion that "it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opin-
ion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon").
144. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-17.
145. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464.
146. Id.; Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1998).
147. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464 (stating that a commutation decision "generally depends
not simply on objective factfinding, but also on purely subjective evaluations and on pre-
dictions of future behavior by those entrusted with the decision").
148. Id.
149. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
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our people [that it is] ranked as fundamental."' ° By recognizing a
constitutional right of access to state-held DNA evidence, the Court
could ensure the integrity and utility of the clemency process as the
last hope and "fail safe" for the constitutionally convicted yet innocent
prisoner. 1
5 1
C. Addressing the Traditional Concerns in Establishing a Post-Conviction
Constitutional Right of Access to DNA Evidence
The resistance to the creation of a right of post-conviction access to
DNA evidence has not been purely theoretical. Indeed, the court in
Harvey identified several concerns with the consequences of such a
right, including issues of compromising finality, creating a burden on
the criminal justice system, and disruptions of notions of federal-
ism.1 52 Although the Harvey court's concerns are legitimate, a consti-
tutional right of access premised on the ability to meaningfully access
the clemency process would not offend the principles the Harvey court
used to trump the creation of that right. 51
1. Finality.-The Fourth Circuit misidentified the issue in
Harvey when it stated: "[w] e are asked to declare a general constitu-
tional right for every inmate to continually challenge a valid convic-
tion based on whatever technological advances may have occurred
since his conviction became final."'154 The court further claimed that
the "possibility of post-conviction developments, whether in law or sci-
ence, is simply too great to justify judicially sanctioned constitutional
attacks upon final criminal judgments."155 However, what is proposed
in this Comment is not a method for pursuing the invalidity of judg-
ments through the judicial system, but a method of ensuring that pris-
150. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (holding that in issues of criminal
procedure, in order to prevent intrusion "upon the administration ofjustice by the individ-
ual States," a decision is "not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it
offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental" (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1992)
(internal citations omitted))).
151. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-17.
152. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 298-304 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concur-
ring in the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc).
153. Chief Judge Wilkinson's resistance to a right of post-conviction access to DNA evi-
dence was premised on a prisoner's ability to use this evidence in an actual innocence
claim presented in court. Id. at 299. This Comment does not dispute that a right of post-
conviction access to DNA evidence, coupled with the ability to bring a claim of actual
innocence, would have farther reaching consequences than a right of access for the pur-
pose of presenting material evidence to a clemency authority.
154. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002).
155. Id. at 376.
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oners can meaningfully participate in the clemency process, free from
judicial review.
Indeed, the Harvey court's refusal to recognize a right to judicially
attack constitutional convictions properly respects the concept of fi-
nality of constitutional convictions that has been one of the corner-
stones of our criminal justice system. However, if a right of access is
instead premised on an ability to access the clemency process, the in-
tegrity of constitutional convictions will not be threatened. Had the
prisoner, Harvey, been given a right of access to his DNA evidence, he
would have still had no right to present that evidence in a judicial
forum.' 5 6 Instead, Harvey would have had to rely on the strength of
his evidence to win a pardon from the executive. 57 The constitu-
tional right of access proposed in this Comment recognizes that the
clemency process is the proper forum for raising actual innocence
claims. 158
Therefore, because a constitutional right premised on the mean-
ingful right of access to clemency is not based on the ability to attack
final judgments in state courts, no court would be forced to face the
"embarrassing question" of whether an innocent person has been con-
victed, despite the broad protections of the Constitution. 159 Rather,
this duty would remain with the clemency authority, whose decision is
not subject to judicial review.16
2. Burden on the System.-The Harvey court also suggested that
the creation of a constitutional right of access to DNA testing would
create an undue burden on the criminal justice system. 6' However,
this argument is premised on a broad creation of such a right.'62 De-
spite the legitimate questions posed by Chief Judge Wilkinson con-
cerning the scope of an assumed right, and Judge Luttig's failure to
articulate the scope of his proposed right to access state-held DNA
156. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (failing to recognize a freestanding claim of actual
innocence).
157. Id. at 417.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (finding that com-
mutation decisions, like appeals for clemency, are "rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for
judicial review").
161. See Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 301 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) (finding that the benefits of creating a
federal constitutional right to access DNA evidence do not outweigh the drain on re-
sources that would result).
162. Id. Chief Judge Wilkinson characterizes the intent ofJudge Luttig as one to create
a constitutional "right of access to the fruits of scientific discoveries." Id.
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evidence, the existence of a narrowly confined right, described in the
next section, would create no more burden on the system than is nec-
essary to ensure that all viable claims of actual innocence are ad-
dressed by the proper authority. 6 ' Judge King of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, addressing an identical ques-
tion in In re Braxton,'6 4 rejected the argument that "an influx of mo-
tions for DNA testing and preservation of evidence in the district
courts... would result in 'serious, perhaps irreparable consequences,'
where the courts presumably would dispose of the motions on their
merits in the regular course of business."' 6 5 Indeed, using the con-
cept of a broad right as a strawman ignores the impact that a narrowly
defined right would have in balancing the burden on the system with
the interest of preventing the incarceration (and possible execution)
of innocent individuals. A constitutional right premised on access to
the clemency process would have no more impact on the system than
would a statute granting this same right. Indeed, had a burden on the
system been a legitimate interest, the Virginia legislature would not
have enacted a statute granting prisoners access to old DNA evi-
dence.' 6 6 Although Chief Judge Wilkinson's interest in an efficient
criminal justice system is well-founded, establishing a limited right of
access to DNA testing recognizes the stronger interest of preventing
the confinement of innocent prisoners. 6 7
3. Federalism.-In addition to concerns over finality and burden-
ing the system, the Harvey court also stated that the proper forum for
determining a right to post-conviction access to DNA testing is the
legislature, not the judiciary.16 8 However, this notion is based on con-
fidence, albeit well-founded, that the legislature will provide the ap-
propriate remedy. In placing the responsibility with the legislature,
the court avoids the question that would be raised had the Virginia
163. Id. at 300-01; id. at 320-21 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
164. 258 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2001).
165. Id. at 259.
166. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2.-327.1 (2002) (allowing convicted felons in Virginia to
apply to the court for DNA testing if biological evidence was not tested using modern DNA
technology and the testing is "materially relevant, noncumulative, and necessary and may
prove the convicted person's actual innocence").
167. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (stating "[a]fter all, the central
purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent").
168. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 301, 303 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
and rehearing en banc) (finding that constitutionalization of the right of access to DNA
evidence despite "all this legislative activity and variation is to evince nothing less than a
loss of faith in democracy").
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legislature refused to recognize such a right.169 Indeed, it is up to the
legislature to determine what post-conviction options are available to
a prisoner. t 70 However, for the judiciary to recognize a right of post-
conviction access to DNA testing neither disturbs nor supercedes the
ability of the legislature to determine a prisoner's ability to utilize the
judiciary to attack the validity of a conviction. Because the courts do
not recognize a claim of actual innocence, Harvey's access to DNA
testing affords him no more ability to attack his proper conviction
than if he was denied the access to testing.171 Indeed, had Harvey's
testing been favorable, he would have had to rely either on the discre-
tion of the prosecutor to re-open his case, or appeal to the traditional
avenue of the clemency process. 1 2 The ability to pass on the inno-
cence or guilt of a properly convicted individual remains firmly inde-
pendent from the judiciary. 7  Therefore, affording a prisoner a
constitutional right to access and test old evidence does not "improp-
erly short-circuit legislative activity." '174
Despite the fact that many legislatures have acted and passed stat-
utes granting post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing, the
need for a judicial recognition of a constitutional right of meaningful
access to the clemency process still persists. 75 However, it remains up
to the state legislatures to determine a prisoner's ability to utilize the
new test results in the judicial arena.'76
169. ChiefJudge Ailkinson curiously neglected to mention this possibility, even though
he stated, as the first sentence in his opinion: "There is no doubt that Harvey should re-
ceive the biological evidence in this case for DNA testing using technology that was unavail-
able at the time his Virginia conviction became final." Id. at 298.
170. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
171. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
172. Masters, supra note 113; see Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412 n.13 (stating "clemency has
provided the historic mechanism for obtaining relief in such circumstances").
173. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (finding the clem-
ency process free from the limits of the due process clause); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998) (supporting the executive branch's control over clem-
ency because the executive can consider a whole range of factors that the judiciary
cannot).
174. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 376.
175. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc).
176. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-11 (noting the diversity in the length of time in which
different states allow prisoners to bring motions for new trials based on newly discovered
evidence).
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D. The Parameters of an Effective Constitutional Right of Post-Conviction
Access to DNA Evidence
Although Judge Luttig, in Harvey, recognized the existence of a due
process right of post-conviction access to DNA testing, he failed to
fully define the parameters of such a right.'7 7 Indeed, Judge Luttig
merely stated that he would "narrowly confine the right," and that
"the standards governing when this right may be asserted would be
correspondingly strict and limiting."178 It is proper to note, as Chief
Judge Wilkinson did, that there is significant disagreement as to the
specifics of such a right.'7 9 Although the scope of such a right has
been strenuously debated in both state legislatures and Congress, it is
apparent that there is near universal agreement on the basic frame-
work that would make up a "narrowly confine[d]" right of access. 180
1. The Substantive Right.-As a substantive matter, the right to
access DNA testing should only be available in situations where a
favorable test result would be "materially relevant ... and may prove
the convicted person's actual innocence." 8 This standard, based on
Virginia's recently enacted statute concerning a prisoner's right to ac-
cess,"' is not trivial. The Court in United States v. Bagley,l  defined
material evidence as evidence that if disclosed, has the potential to
"undermine confidence in the outcome" of a criminal proceeding. 1 84
Although the Court has refused to create a specific standard for deter-
mining "actual innocence," the Court in Schlup v. Delo1 85 used the "un-
dermine confidence in the outcome" standard to craft a standard for
when a prisoner may use "actual innocence" as a gateway to pursue a
time-barred constitutional violation."8 6 The nature of the right of
post-conviction access proposed in this Comment is essentially a
method to present evidence of factual evidence to a clemency author-
177. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 321 (Luttig,J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (stat-
ing that the mootness of the issue rendered it imprudent to flesh out the parameters and
standards of a theoretical right).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 302-03 (highlighting the differences in state statutes granting prisoners the
right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence).
180. Id. at 300-01 (stating "Harvey would have the federal courts disregard the fact that
both the Congress of the United States and the various state legislatures are presently wres-
tling with exactly these sorts of questions").
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2002).
182. Id.
183. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
184. Id. at 682.
185. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
186. Id. at 316; see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 392 (1993) (suggesting that any
claim of actual innocence would have to meet an "extraordinarily high" threshold).
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ity. Therefore, it is proper to apply a Bagley standard since the inher-
ent goal of the clemency process is to ensure that confidence remains
in an infallible criminal justice system by "preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted." '87
In addition, several sources suggest that a right of access to DNA
testing should only be available when identity was an issue at trial.' 88
However, this requirement is not necessary, as any favorable DNA test
result which would prove a prisoner's "actual innocence," would by
definition involve a situation in which identity was an issue at trial. In
Jenner v. Dooley,189 the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in recognizing
a right of access, considered post-conviction testing to be most appro-
priate when:
(a) identity of a single perpetrator is at issue; (b) evidence
against the defendant is so weak as to suggest real doubt of
guilt; (c) the scientific evidence, if any, used to obtain the
conviction has been impugned; and, (d) the nature of the
biological evidence makes testing results on the issue of iden-
tity virtually dispositive.19 °
While these guidelines assist in presenting examples of the
proper use of the right, such articulation of the boundaries of a right
may be unnecessarily limiting. Indeed, a court utilizing this right of
access should have the discretion to determine the circumstances
under which exculpatory modern DNA testing could undermine con-
fidence in a criminal conviction.
2. The Procedural Right.-Next, it is important to define the pro-
cedural safeguards that would ensure that any post-conviction DNA
testing is reliable and valid. First, courts and statutes, such as Vir-
ginia's recently enacted DNA access statute,19' have consistently pro-
vided access only where the evidence has been subjected "to a chain of
custody sufficient to establish that the evidence has not been altered,
tampered with, or substituted in any way." '192 In addition, the testing
method utilized must itself be recognized as reliable.1 93 Therefore,
the testing method must meet the reliability standards of those testing
187. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12.
188. See, e.g., MD. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-201 (2001);Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d
463, 472 (S.D. 1998).
189. 590 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1998).
190. Id. at 472.
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2002).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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methods used for test results admissible during a valid trial.'94 In the
interest of finality, any right of access to DNA testing should also re-
quire that the requested method of testing be of a type not available at
the time that a prisoner's conviction became final.195 Also, pursuant
to Supreme Court precedent finding no right to counsel subsequent
to a first appeal of right, a constitutional right of post-conviction ac-
cess to DNA testing would not confer a right of counsel on a prisoner
who wishes to exercise his right.1 96
Chief Judge Wilkinson, in Harvey, also raised the question of who
would bear the costs of the DNA testing.'97 Although some statutes
present a scheme in which the cost of a DNA test is predicated on the
outcome of such a test, the fundamental nature of the right as a
method of preventing a miscarriage ofjustice dictates that the "deter-
mination of when the State should pay for DNA testing should be left
to the discretion of the trial court."' 98 Although a state's legislature
may deem that additional safeguards are necessary, these require-
ments would ensure that a right of access to post-conviction DNA test-
ing would only be granted in "extraordinary circumstances." '199
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that unless a state provides an
additional remedy, clemency is the sole remedy for the constitution-
ally convicted yet innocent prisoner.2"' Therefore, certain safeguards
must exist to ensure that an actually innocent prisoner has the ability
to properly communicate his innocence to the appropriate authority.
If a prisoner has been convicted on the basis of DNA evidence and
new testing procedures have the ability to substantially demonstrate
actual innocence, the due process clause of the Constitution man-
dates that the prisoner be given access to that exculpatory evidence.
While a limited right of meaningful access to the clemency process
does not eliminate the nature of clemency as an "act of grace" not
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
197. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring
in the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc).
198. See MD. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-201 (2001); see also Mebane v. State, 902 P.2d
494, 498 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (leaving the decision to provide funds for the DNA testing to
the "sound discretion of the trial court").
199. Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 472 (S.D. 1999) (stating that "[o]nly in ex-
traordinary circumstances should a court allow post-conviction scientific testing").
200. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412-13 (1993).
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subject to judicial review,20 1 a prisoner's ability to adequately commu-
nicate his post-conviction innocence at the clemency stage serves the
interests ofjustice while preserving the integrity of the criminal justice
system.
RYAN DIETRICH
201. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1998).
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